# ROUMELL <br> ASSET MANAGEMENT 

Finding Value through Out of Favor,
Overlooked and Misunderstood Securities

## What We Do

- Opportunistic Capital Allocators
- No target weightings
- Cash: in the absence of attractive investments, we hold cash
- Bonds: asset-backed, higher yielding smaller corporate issues
- Stocks: all cap, all sectors
- Predominantly US securities
- Deep Value, Bottom Up Investors: seek securities with highly specific risk/reward characteristics rather than market exposure
- Products:
- Separately managed accounts
- Roumell Opportunistic Value Fund (RAMSX, RAMVX)
- Offered at Schwab, Fidelity, Raymond James, Sterne Agee, Pershing, First Clearing, and www.roumellfund.com
- \$300 million assets under management


## RAM Core Tenets

- We find value through securities that are out of favor, overlooked, or misunderstood, where an investment edge is more likely
- In the absence of compelling investment opportunities, we hold cash
- We invest in companies with strong balance sheets, an approach that we believe dramatically reduces our risk of permanent loss of capital
- Our research process is relentless and includes regular travel to see management teams, assets, customers, and competitors firsthand
- We believe that the temperament to remain steadfast in our analytical conviction, especially when others are consumed by fear or blinded by enthusiasm, is necessary to obtaining superior long-term returns


## The Importance of Incentives

|  |  | nancia | Insid | Owner |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | E2010 |  |  |
| Company | Ticker | Inside Ownership | Book Value | Inside Ownership | Book Value | 5 Year <br> Book Value <br> Growth | 5 Year Stock Performance | 10 Year Stock Performance |
| Raymond James Financial | RJF | 15.1\% | \$10.95 | 19.7\% | \$18.43 | 68.3\% | 30.2\% | 111.0\% |
| Goldman Sachs | GS | 15\%* | \$57.02 | 9.9\% | \$128.72 | 125.7\% | 31.7\% | 57.2\% |
| Citigroup | C | 1.1\% | \$223.71 | 0.2\% | \$56.15 | -74.9\% | -90.3\% | -90.0\% |
| Bank of America | BAC | 1.3\% | \$25.32 | 0.2\% | \$20.99 | -17.1\% | -71.1\% | -41.8\% |
| Lehman Brothers | LEH | 3.9\% | \$57.84 | 0.0\% | \$0.00 | -100.0\% | -99.9\% | -99.9\% |
| Roumell Asset Management, LLC (Total Return Composite) |  |  |  |  |  |  | 27.9\% | 172.2\% |
| S\&P 500 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 12.0\% | 15.1\% |
| Russell 2000 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 24.4\% | 84.7\% |
| Russell 2000 Value |  |  |  |  |  |  | 18.8\% | 124.3\% |

* Estimate assumes Goldman Sachs partners, which owned just over 50\% following the 1999 IPO, sold 6\% per year through YE 2005
- The history of financial markets remind us of the importance of incentives
- The partners of Roumell Asset Management invest right alongside their clients


## Low-Liquidity Value vs. High-Liquidity Growth

## Value and Liquidity Both Predict Returns

U.S. Equity Annual Return Quartiles (1972-2010)


Source: "Liquidity as an Investment Style," Ibbotson, Chen, and Wu, April 2011.

## Using Volatility to Our Advantage

| Top Ten Equity Holdings | High Purchase |  | Low purchase |  | Average Purchase |  | Market Price* |  | Unrealized G/L |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Tecumseh Products | \$ | 10.37 | \$ | 3.22 | \$ | 6.12 | \$ | 11.39 | 86.1\% |
| Apple Computer | \$ | 547.20 | \$ | 395.51 | \$ | 473.28 | \$ | 422.74 | -10.7\% |
| Tetra Technologies | \$ | 8.57 | \$ | 6.02 | \$ | 6.69 | \$ | 10.80 | 61.4\% |
| SeaChange International | \$ | 9.50 | \$ | 6.77 | \$ | 7.69 | \$ | 11.56 | 50.3\% |
| Ultra Petroleum | \$ | 24.45 | \$ | 16.09 | \$ | 18.53 | \$ | 21.01 | 13.4\% |
| Digital Generation | \$ | 14.28 | \$ | 6.90 | \$ | 10.58 | \$ | 7.78 | -26.5\% |
| Sandstorm Metals \& Energy | \$ | 4.84 | \$ | 2.59 | \$ | 3.09 | \$ | 2.28 | -26.2\% |
| DSP Group | \$ | 8.48 | \$ | 5.30 | \$ | 7.30 | \$ | 8.50 | 16.4\% |
| Sierra Wireless | \$ | 11.70 | \$ | 6.21 | \$ | 8.21 | \$ | 13.45 | 63.8\% |
| Aeropostale | \$ | 13.81 | \$ | 12.66 | \$ | 13.61 | \$ | 14.44 | 6.1\% |

* Market prices as of 7/10/13

The specific securities identified and described do not represent all of the securities purchased, sold, or recommended for advisory clients and the reader should not assume that investments in the securities identified and discussed were or will be profitable. Refer to disclosures in addendum.

## Corporate Bonds

- In 2009 when corporate bond spreads widened dramatically, we increased our bond exposure from less than $5 \%$ to $40 \%$ *
- We are principally invested in bonds of companies possessing hard assets, such as energy reserves, purchased at an average yield of over $8 \%$
- The S\&P 500 (including dividends) annualized at less than $8 \%$ in over $40 \%$ of the monthly rolling ten year periods since 1926
- Our allocation to bonds and stocks is strictly a reflection of available opportunities; we have no mandate to invest a certain percentage of assets in bonds
- As high yield bonds have recently reached record low yields, we have reduced our bond exposure to less than $10 \%$

[^0]
## Sandstorm Metals \& Energy (STTYD)

## Overlooked Micro-Cap

- Sandstorm provides financing to small resource companies in exchange for the right to purchase a percent of production at a price below the cost of production
- Sandstorm's contracts allow it to buy copper at $\$ 0.80$ (market value $\$ 3.23$ ), natural gas at $\$ 1.00$ (market value \$3.85), and palladium at $\$ 100$ (market value \$768)
- Sandstorm has the right to seize underlying assets of the companies it finances if cash flow guarantees are not met
- CEO Nolan Watson has been very successful implementing this streaming model at Silver Wheaton (SLW) and Sandstorm Gold (SAND)

* We periodically reassess our price targets. We expect Sandstorm to close more streaming deals, which could impact our price target.


## Tecumseh Products Co. (TECUA/B)

## Mature Special Situation

- Pure-play compressor company (refrigeration \& AC) founded in 1930 possessing a large embedded global footprint
- The company believes it will generate 8$10 \%$ EBITDA margins by 2015 on its $\$ 700$ million in sales after exiting unprofitable lines
- Tecumseh plans to monetize valuable noncore assets in Brazil and India
- Recent investment in upgraded products receiving positive feedback from key distributors and customers
- The founding family, which controls 35\% of the voting stock, recently exited the board, and the voting and non-voting shares will be collapsed into one share class

| Tecumseh Products Co. (TECUA) <br> (\$s in millions except per share amounts) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Market Cap (as of 7/10/13) | \$ | 210 |
| Net Debt | \$ | 18 |
| Enterprise Value | \$ | 228 |
| Sum of the Parts - Value Commercial Compressor Business |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| Sales |  | 700 |
| EBITDA |  | 70 |
| Interest expense |  | (9) |
| Taxes (low due to \$400mm NOLs) |  | (3) |
| Capex |  | (30) |
| Free cash flow |  | 28 |
| Value at 10x free cash flow |  | 280 |
| Brazilian assets fair value |  | 90 |
| Indian real estate |  | 70 |
|  |  | 160 |
| Expect $\$ 50 \mathrm{~mm}$ of asset sales to be reinvested Sum of the parts |  | (50) |
|  | \$ | 390 |
| Total estimated value per share* | \$ | 21.00 |
| Average cost per share | \$ | 6.12 |

* We periodically reassess our estimates of intrinsic value.


## Apple Inc (AAPL)

## Out of Favor Large-Cap

- Apple has a $25 \%$ share of the global smart phone market, which should continue to grow at a high rate as the world's 5 billion users of "dumb-phones" convert to smart phones
- Its installed base of $\sim 250$ million customers provides high recurring revenues as the company releases upgraded products
- Apple's customers are sought after by phone carriers because they spend $2-3 x$ more on average on phone plans and spend more time on the Internet than any other phone
- Apple's balance sheet and profitability ratios are significantly stronger than the average company in the S\&P 500, yet Apple trades at half the market multiple
- Management has committed to returning $\$ 100 /$ share to investors by year end 2015

| Apple Inc (AAPL) <br> (Amounts in billions except per share data) |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Market Cap (as of 7/10/13) | \$396 |
| Total Debt | \$0 |
| Less Cash \& Investments | -\$145 |
| Net Cash | -\$145 |
| Enterprise value | \$251 |
| Return on Equity Comparison |  |
| Apple | 33\% |
| S\&P 500 Index Median | 14\% |
| Net Debt / Shareholders Equity Comparis |  |
| Apple | -107\% |
| S\&P 500 Index Median | 38\% |
| EV / '13 Free Cash Flow | 6.0 |
| EV / '13 Earnings | 7.0 |
| S\&P 500 '13 Earnings Multiple | 14.9 |
| Total estimated value per share* | \$800 |
| Average cost per share | \$473 |

* We periodically reassess our price targets. We value Apple based on a $50 \%$ premium to the earnings multiple for which Dell is being acquired, plus cash.


## RAM's Performance Under Pressure

## During the Tech/Internet Bubble:

- RAM avoided investing in overvalued technology and internet stocks
- We maintained an average cash balance of 27\% in 2001/2002
- We focused on ignored older economy companies

| Bursting of the Tech/Internet Bubble |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | RAM Total Return (Net) | $\begin{aligned} & S \& P \\ & 500 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Russell } \\ 2000 \end{gathered}$ | Russell 2000 Value |
| 2000 | 8.0\% | -9.1\% | -3.0\% | 22.8\% |
| 2001 | 32.8\% | -11.9\% | 2.5\% | 14.0\% |
| 2002 | -10.2\% | -22.1\% | -20.5\% | -11.4\% |
| Cumulative Return | 28.8\% | -37.6\% | -21.0\% | 24.1\% |

## During the Financial Crisis:

- In late 2007, RAM sold substantially all of its financial stocks, and limited further exposure to equities
- In late 2008/early 2009, we allocated significant capital to purchase high yield bonds trading at deep discounts to par value


## RAM's Total Return Composite Performance

- Rolling three year performance* since inception in 1999 has exceeded the S\&P 500 76\% of the time with on average 61\% exposure to equities
* 46 discrete three-year periods calculated quarterly
- Annualized performance since inception is $10.7 \%$ compared to $3.6 \%, 7.3 \%$ and $8.9 \%$ for the S\&P 500, Russell 2000 and Russell 2000 Value, respectively
- Cumulative performance since inception is $324 \%$ compared to $66 \%, 172 \%$ and $238 \%$ for the S\&P 500, Russell 2000 and Russell 2000 Value, respectively

Please refer to the Annual Disclosure Presentation for our Total Return Composite which has been prepared and presented in compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®).

## Pitfalls of Chasing Performance

Average Stock Fund Return vs. Average Stock Fund Investor Return
(1991-2010)


Source: Quantitative Anatysis of investor Behiavior by Dalbar, inc. (March 2011) and Lipper. Dalbar computed the "average stock furd investor" returns by using industry cash flow reports from the Investment Company institute The "average stock fund return" figures represent the average return for all funds listed in Lipper'S U.S. Diversified Equity fund classification model. Dalbar also measured the behavior of a "systematic equity" and "asset allocation" investor. The annualized return for these investor types was $3.6 \%$ and $2.6 \%$ respectively over the time frame measured. All Dalbar returns were computed using the S\&P $500^{*}$ Index. Returns assume reinvestment of dividends and capital gain distributions.

## Where We Fit in a Portfolio

- Because we hold between 25 and 35 equity or debt securities, in addition to a healthy cash balance, we believe our portfolio offers adequate diversification on its own
- Advisors typically allocate 5\%-20\% to RAM to complement direct market exposure (index funds), or in conjunction with other strategies such as large-cap growth
- Rarely will our portfolio holdings have much overlap with other mutual funds


## Key Takeaways

- Robust Research Discipline
- We get out of the office and see assets and people firsthand
- We develop and leverage relationships to augment our understanding of what we own
- We find value by investing in securities that are out of favor, overlooked or misunderstood
- Fiduciary
- The Partners at RAM invest right alongside our clients
- We do not inflate client trade costs to obtain free research
- We report all realized gains and losses in our mutual fund
- We report average cost basis for holdings in our mutual fund


## Roumell Asset Management, LLC SMA Historical Performance (since inception)

|  | RAM | S\&P | Russell | Russell | RAM | Thomson |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | Total Return | 500 | 2000 | 2000 Value | Balanced | Balanced |
| 1999 | 26.02\% | 21.04\% | 21.26\% | -1.49\% | 12.53\% | 8.35\% |
| 2000 | 7.97\% | -9.10\% | -3.02\% | 22.83\% | 8.47\% | 1.95\% |
| 2001 | 32.76\% | -11.89\% | 2.49\% | 14.02\% | 21.18\% | -4.19\% |
| 2002 | -10.15\% | -22.10\% | -20.48\% | -11.43\% | -9.70\% | -11.36\% |
| 2003 | 32.13\% | 28.69\% | 47.25\% | 46.03\% | 28.26\% | 18.60\% |
| 2004 | 20.18\% | 10.88\% | 18.33\% | 22.25\% | 16.48\% | 7.79\% |
| 2005 | 12.38\% | 4.91\% | 4.55\% | 4.71\% | 8.56\% | 4.22\% |
| 2006 | 16.89\% | 15.79\% | 18.37\% | 23.48\% | 14.00\% | 10.47\% |
| 2007 | -7.67\% | 5.49\% | -1.57\% | -9.78\% | -7.58\% | 5.76\% |
| 2008 | -27.35\% | -36.99\% | -33.79\% | -28.93\% | -22.82\% | -26.97\% |
| 2009 | 42.19\% | 26.47\% | 27.18\% | 20.57\% | 33.19\% | 23.19\% |
| 2010 | 14.71\% | 15.06\% | 26.85\% | 24.49\% | 12.25\% | 11.75\% |
| 2011 | -9.51\% | 2.11\% | -4.19\% | -5.49\% | -5.19\% | 0.53\% |
| 2012 | 13.92\% | 16.00\% | 16.35\% | 18.05\% | 10.50\% | 11.71\% |
| 1Q13 | 11.11\% | 10.61\% | 12.39\% | 11.63\% | 8.93\% | 5.51\% |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cumulative Return | $324.24 \%$ | $65.89 \%$ | 172.19\% | $\mathbf{2 3 8 . 0 6 \%}$ | $200.57 \%$ | 73.92 \% |

Please refer to the Annual Disclosure Presentations for our Total Return and Balanced Composites, which have been prepared and presented in compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS ${ }^{\circledR}$ ). Performance reflects RAM's deep value investment strategy. Returns are reported net of all management fees and applicable trading costs and include the reinvestment of all income. Investors should understand that past performance is not indicative of future performance. Investors should not assume that investments made on their behalf by RAM will be profitable and may, in fact, result in a loss. Ashland Partners \& Co. LLP, our independent verifier, completed its examination of the firm's performance returns for the period of 1999 (inception) through March 31, 2013.

## Performance Since Inception

Roumell Asset Management, LLC Total Return Composite vs. Indices Cumulative Return Since Inception at 01/01/99 through 12/31/12


Please refer to the Annual Disclosure Presentation for our Total Return Composite, which has been prepared and presented in compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®). Performance reflects RAM's deep value investment strategy. Returns are reported net of all management fees and applicable trading costs and include the reinvestment of all income. Investors should understand that past performance is not indicative of future performance. Investors should not assume that investments made on their behalf by RAM will be profitable and may, in fact, result in a loss. Ashland Partners \& Co. LLP, our independent verifier, completed its examination of the firm's performance returns for the period of 1999 (inception) through March 31, 2013.

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- Please refer to the Annual Disclosure Presentations for our Total Return and Balanced Composites, which have been prepared and presented in compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS ${ }^{\circledR}$ ). Performance reflects RAM’s deep value investment strategy. Returns are reported net of all management fees and applicable trading costs and include the reinvestment of all income. Investors should understand that past performance is not indicative of future performance. Investors should not assume that investments made on their behalf by RAM will be profitable and may, in fact, result in a loss. Ashland Partners \& Co. LLP, our independent verifier, completed its examination of the firm's performance returns for the period of 1999 (inception) through March 31, 2013.

Additional Disclosures:

- The specific securities identified and described do not represent all of the securities purchased, sold, or recommended for advisory clients and the reader should not assume that investments in the securities identified and discussed were or will be profitable.
- A list of all purchases and sales made over the last 12 months is available upon request in compliance with SEC and FINRA advertising rules.


# ROUMELL ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC 

## TOTAL RETURN COMPOSITE

ANNUAL DISCLOSURE PRESENTATION

| Year End | Total Firm Assets (millions) | Composite Assets |  | Annual Performance Results |  |  |  |  | 3-Yr Annualized Standard Deviation |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { USD } \\ & \text { (millions) } \end{aligned}$ | Number of Accounts | Composite Net | $\begin{gathered} \text { S\&P } \\ \mathbf{5 0 0} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Russell } \\ 2000 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Russell } \\ & 2000 \text { Value } \end{aligned}$ | Composite Dispersion | Composite Net <br> Standard <br> Deviation | S\&P $\mathbf{5 0 0}$ Standard Deviation | Russell 2000 Standard Deviation | Russell <br> 2000 Value <br> Standard <br> Deviation |
| 2012 | 286 | 157 | 367 | 13.92\% | 16.00\% | 16.35\% | 18.05\% | 1.86\% | 8.63\% | 15.09\% | 20.20\% | 19.89\% |
| 2011 | 306 | 175 | 466 | -9.51\% | 2.11\% | -4.19\% | -5.49\% | 2.17\% |  |  |  |  |
| 2010 | 311 | 189 | 479 | 14.71\% | 15.06\% | 26.85\% | 24.49\% | 2.17\% |  |  |  |  |
| 2009 | 249 | 153 | 414 | 42.19\% | 26.47\% | 27.18\% | 20.57\% | 5.57\% |  |  |  |  |
| 2008 | 166 | 104 | 413 | -27.35\% | -36.99\% | -33.79\% | -28.93\% | 3.40\% |  |  |  |  |
| 2007 | 270 | 178 | 549 | -7.67\% | 5.49\% | -1.57\% | -9.78\% | 2.68\% |  |  |  |  |
| 2006 | 280 | 176 | 458 | 16.89\% | 15.79\% | 18.37\% | 23.48\% | 2.18\% |  |  |  |  |
| 2005 | 199 | 111 | 312 | 12.38\% | 4.91\% | 4.55\% | 4.71\% | 2.59\% |  |  |  |  |
| 2004 | 123 | 47 | 125 | 20.18\% | 10.88\% | 18.33\% | 22.25\% | 2.69\% |  |  |  |  |
| 2003 | 66 | 15 | 46 | 32.13\% | 28.69\% | 47.25\% | 46.03\% | 4.04\% |  |  |  |  |
| 2002 | 41 | 8 | 44 | -10.15\% | -22.10\% | -20.48\% | -11.43\% | 4.33\% |  |  |  |  |
| 2001 | 31 | 5 | 30 | 32.76\% | -11.89\% | 2.49\% | 14.02\% | 6.33\% |  |  |  |  |
| 2000 | 19 | 2 | 12 | 7.97\% | -9.10\% | -3.02\% | 22.83\% | 4.05\% |  |  |  |  |
| 1999 | 16 | 2 | 9 | 26.02\% | 21.04\% | 21.26\% | -1.49\% | 3.92\% |  |  |  |  |





 January 1, 1999. Prior to January 1, 2013, this composite was known as the Equity Composite.


 verification and performance examination reports are available upon request.
 accounts no longer with the firm. Past performance is not indicative of future results.



 foreign withhol ding taxes. Withholding taxes may vary according to the investor's domicile.


 presentations are available upon request.
 Wrap Fee Services: determined by sponsor. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients may vary.

## ROUMELL ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC BALANCED COMPOSITE <br> ANNUAL DISCLOSURE PRESENTATION

| Year End | Total Firm Assets (millions) | Composite Assets |  | Annual Performance Results |  |  | 3-Yr Annualized Standard Deviation |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { USD } \\ \text { (millions) } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Number of Accounts | Composite <br> Net | Thomson US <br> Balanced <br> Mutual Fund | Composite <br> Dispersion | Composite Net Standard Deviation | Thompson US BL MF Standard Deviation |
| 2012 | 286 | 82 | 156 | 10.50\% | 11.71\% | 3.02\% | 6.50\% | 9.79\% |
| 2011 | 306 | 79 | 173 | -5.19\% | 0.53\% | 4.28\% |  |  |
| 2010 | 311 | 83 | 167 | 12.25\% | 11.75\% | 2.59\% |  |  |
| 2009 | 249 | 55 | 124 | 33.19\% | 23.19\% | 5.79\% |  |  |
| 2008 | 166 | 40 | 121 | -22.82\% | -26.97\% | 5.01\% |  |  |
| 2007 | 270 | 75 | 154 | -7.58\% | 5.76\% | 3.71\% |  |  |
| 2006 | 280 | 87 | 158 | 14.00\% | 10.47\% | 3.69\% |  |  |
| 2005 | 199 | 73 | 142 | 8.56\% | 4.22\% | 2.67\% |  |  |
| 2004 | 123 | 66 | 119 | 16.48\% | 7.79\% | 3.82\% |  |  |
| 2003 | 66 | 42 | 100 | 28.26\% | 18.60\% | 3.94\% |  |  |
| 2002 | 41 | 27 | 79 | -9.70\% | -11.36\% | 3.77\% |  |  |
| 2001 | 31 | 17 | 39 | 21.18\% | -4.19\% | 4.75\% |  |  |
| 2000 | 19 | 10 | 23 | 8.47\% | 1.95\% | 4.53\% |  |  |
| 1999 | 16 | 9 | 22 | 12.53\% | 8.35\% | 2.63\% |  |  |





 The Thomson US Balanced Mutual Fund Index is a blend of more than 500 bal anced mutual funds and is therefore deemed to more accurately reflect the strategy of the composite. The Balanced Composite was created January 1,1999


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 accounts no longer with the firm. Past performance is not indicative of future results.



 rate source utilized by the portfolios within the composite may vary. Composite performance is presented net of foreign withholding taxes. Withholding taxes may vary according to the investor's domicile.


 presentations are available upon request.
 Wrap Fee Services: determined by sponsor. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients may vary.


[^0]:    * Summary of all bond purchases since January 2009 available upon request.

